This study explores regional bias in Heisman voting from 1990-2016 using a negative binomial regression model with player-year fixed effects. Analysis confirms finalists receive higher vote tallies in home regions, on average. Additionally, results show regional vote tallies are decreasing in the fraction of other finalists in-region. Furthermore, evidence reveals finalists receive higher vote tallies for each game played against in-region teams and lower vote tallies for each game played by other finalists against in-region teams. Analysis is augmented by showing the recent increase in national television coverage of college football has been accompanied by a decline in regional bias. 5 6 7 8 9 10
ing about 2014 is that it is the first year in which the 264 whole schedule of games for all finalists were nation-265 ally televised. This is due to the relatively recent 266 increase in the number of national channels carrying 267 weekly college football games, especially among net-268 works devoted to a single conference such as the Big 269 Ten Network, and SEC Network. 270 What is quite noticeable in this case is that, while finalist's vote tally in a given region has the potential 286 to be influenced by the region in which the finalist's 287 university is based. While one may expect to find the 288 strongest observed impact of regional bias when the 289 finalist and voters are based in the same region, there 290 is also the potential that vote tallies for finalists based 291 in nearby regions will be greater than for finalists 292 based further away. For example, one may expect that 293 a finalist based in the Mid-Atlantic region will receive 294 a higher vote tally from voters in the Northeast region 295 than from voters in the Far West region. The expected 296 impact of the intersection of player region and voter 297 region may be lessened when many finalists are based 298 in the same or nearby regions. For instance, if more 299 than one finalist is based in a single region the regional 300 vote may be split among the in-region finalists, but 301 if only one finalist is based in-region he may receive 302 the lion's share of regional votes. 303 One should also expect that any factor that would 304 impact one finalist will have the opposite effect on 305 one or more other finalists since the vote share is 306 zero-sum. This suggests that when there are one or 307 more finalists from or in close proximity to a given 308 region that other finalists may receive lower vote tal-309 lies from voters based in that particular region, on 310 average. Moreover, the more finalists based in or 311 near a particular region, the lower one might expect 312 other finalists' vote tallies from that particular region 313 will be.
314
From the examples discussed in the last subsection, 315 it appears the location of a finalist's opponents also 316 plays a factor in regional vote tallies. This appears 317 noticeably true in many other cases not discussed, 318 especially in cases where a finalist is based in one 319 region but plays in a conference where the majority 320 of opponents are located in another region. Therefore, 321 one may expect a ceteris paribus positive relationship 322 between the vote tally a player receives from voters 323 in a particular region and the number of games he 324 plays against opponents based in the region. Like-325 wise, since voting is a zero-sum game, one may also 326 expect a ceteris paribus negative relationship between 327 a finalist's regional vote tally and the number of 328 games other finalists play against opponents based 329 in that region.
330
Observing the examples examined in the previous 331 subsection, it also appears the expansion of national 332 television coverage of college football games has had 333 a substantial impact on the pervasiveness of regional 334 bias. The average percent difference across all final-335 ists between the vote tally a finalist received in his 336 home region and the average vote tally across all 337 other regions, referred to in Table 1 Notes: Each player's home region is indicated by † . Percent bias is calculated as the difference between the number of votes in a player's home region and the average number of votes across all other regions divided by the latter. The graph makes it clear there has been a substantial increase in national television coverage of finalists over this time period that coincides with a rather steep decline in average percent bias. This reveals the possibility that national television coverage may play some role in attenuating regional bias. also decrease the importance of their playing 364 opponents' locations. Notes: Differences between 'in region' and 'out of region' samples exist at the 1% level among 'region tally' and 'opposing teams in region.' Differences in 'region tally,' 'opposing teams in region,' and 'finalists avg. opposing teams in region' are estimated from separate negative binomial regressions that include the 'in region' indicator as a regressor, while the difference in the 'fraction other finalists in region' is estimated from a least squared regression that includes the 'in region' indicator as a regressor. There are too few observations of finalists from the Northeast region to calculate all the necessary descriptive statistics. Thus, the boxplots for finalists from the Northeast region only display the range of observations. What is most evident in this figure is the dramatic extent of same-region bias. In nearly all regions, the 25th percentile of percent bias for finalists based within the region is above or close to being above the 75th percentile for finalists based in each other region. Notes: Data from all years 1990-2016 were used to estimate the model. Each coefficient can be interpreted as the expected change in the difference in logs of expected 'region tally' associated with a unit increase in the corresponding predictor variable. Large attenuation occurs in coefficient estimates on 'player in region' and 'fraction other finalists in region' when 'opposing teams in region' and 'finalists avg. opposing teams in region' are added to the model due to positive correlations with added variables. The p-value of alpha is calculated from the likelihood ratio chi-square test that alpha equals zero. Both models also include player-year and region fixed-effects and a constant, which are not shown in the table for the sake of brevity.
share of other finalists from within-region. Note that Fig. 3 . Distributions of outcome and predicted values. Notes: Data from all years 1990-2016 were used to estimate each distribution. The graph shows the distribution of the observed region tally and the predicted values from estimation of Equation 1b, which includes 'player in region,' 'fraction other finalists in region,' the interaction term between the two variables, 'fraction other finalists in region,' finalists avg. opposing teams in region,' and player-year and region fixed effects. Figure 3 shows the model does a good job of predicting the distribution of regional vote tallies. As shown in Fig. 4 , under the counterfactual distri- in turn lead to a determination that each interaction 748 term is not a statistical significant predictor of 749 regional vote tallies when in fact one or both may be. 
758
This results in the following equation: . Because each coefficient is tested against the other four coefficients in the voter region, another set of tests were conducted using the Bonferroni correction with four comparisons at the 5% significance level. All aforementioned differences remain statistically significant (P < 0.05) except in the Far West region between players from the Northeast and South and players from the Northeast and Southwest. that fully-interacts a set of indicator variables specific to each combination of player-region and voter-region with the fraction of other finalists that share the region with the player in question for each region and also includes region-specific estimates of coefficients on 'opposing teams in region' and 'finalists avg. opposing teams in region.' The graph shows distributions of predicted values when the player and voter are in the same region, when the player and voter are in different regions, and the counterfactual distribution when the player and voter are in different regions. This counterfactual distribution is estimated by changing the player region to take the value of the voter region and setting 'opposing teams in region' to the expected value among finalists in the same region as the voter for finalists from a different region than the voters. The distribution of predicted values when the player and voter are in different regions is far to the left of the distribution when the player and voter are in the same region, but estimation of the counterfactual shifts this distribution far to the right to more closely mirror the distribution when the player and voter are in the same region.
While not shown for the sake of brevity, a sen- The largest same-region bias is found in the North- to represent player-year fixed effects using regional 851 data on Heisman finalists from 1990-2016. Results
852
show Heisman finalists do receive higher vote tal-853 lies in their home regions on average. In addition, 854 the results establish that regional Heisman vote tallies are decreasing in the fraction of other finalists 856 based within-region. Furthermore, evidence reveals 857 that finalists receive higher regional vote tallies for 858 each additional game played against a team located 859 within-region and lower regional vote tallies for each 860 additional game played against a team located within-861 region by other finalists. The analysis is augmented by
